The emergence in the 1990s of a nascent project bond Much of the recent work relating to the role of market to fund long-term infrastructure projects in contractual covenants to the determination of bond developing countries merits attention. Dailami and prices has focused on the U.S. corporate bond market Hauswald compile .tailed information on a sample of with its unique bankruptcy code (Chapter 11) and well 105 bonds issued between January 1993 and March developed legal framework, recognizing the bond 2002 for financing infr --'lcrr.. projects in developing contract as the sole instrument of defining the rights and countries, document their contractual covenants, and duties of various parties. In circumstances in which the analyze their pricing determinants. They find that on underpinning legal and institutional frameworks average, project bonds are issued at approximately 300 governing contract formation and enforcement are not basis points above U.S. Treasury securities, have a well developed, the link between bond pricing and legal surprisingly high issue size of US$278 million, a maturity framework becomes important. This finding is confirmed of slightly under 12 years, and are rated slightly below by the authors' econometric analysis of project bond investment grade. In terms of geographic origin, projects pricing model. So, investors take into account the quality in Asia and Latin America have issued more bonds than of the host country's legal framework and reward those located in other regions.
I. Introduction
The emergence in the 1990s of a nascent project bond market to fund long-term infrastructure projects in developing countries, such as electric power plants, roads, ports, airports, telecommunications networks, and water and waste water facilities, merits attention for several reasons. First, they highlight the attractiveness of such investment opportunities that are traditionally the preserve of the public sector for private sources of capital. Second, project bonds are potentially a major source of long-term private debt capital linked directly to economic growth and competitiveness. Third, they are a new asset class in the emerging market debt spectrum, offering asset diversification and investment opportunities particularly to institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds whose long-term liabilities match the long-term tenor of project bonds. Finally, they mirror the shift in the pattern of capital flows from bank loans to publicly issued bonds.'
Although the volume of capital raised through international project bonds remains relatively small, the market has gained maturity in a very short time span, delivering a series of high profile transactions such as US$1.2 billion issued by the Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas project in Qatar, US$1 billion issued by the Petrozuata heavy oil project in Venezuela, 2 and US$125 million issued by the Quezon power project in the Philippines. Today, the market encompasses a broad range of project types, issue sizes, seniorities, and maturities. The total issuance volume worldwide has been on the order of US$25 billion (2000) (2001) of which about one third is attributed to bonds issued by projects located in developing countries. The market's long-term prospects, driven by the massive infrastructure needs in developing countries, look very promising.
For more on global capital flows see the World Bank Global Development Finance 2003; capital flows to infrastructure development are discussed in Dailami and Leipziger (1998) . 2 See Dailami and Hauswald (2001) for an in-depth analysis of the Ras Laffan project and the role that international bond finance played in its successful design and completion. Esty (1999) describes the Petrozuata project, a heavycrude oil project in Venezuela that provides a complementary example to Dailami and Hauswald (2001) and shows how international bond finance could be accessed despite complex legal, contractual, and political risks. Year -Pro*ct Bonds --*-EMBI Gbbal Index USTOY Note: All yields are yields to maturity; the Emerging Market Sovereign yields are from the JP Morgan EMBI Global index.
This note examines the emergence and growth of this market as a new asset class within the emerging-market debt spectrum. The evolution of project bonds is benchmarked against the more established fixed income markets in terms of pricing (at-issue spreads) as well as legal structures and covenant provisions. An examination of a sample of such bonds issued between January 1993 and March 2002 reveals that project indentures contain the standard covenant provisions aimed at mitigating conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders that manifest themselves through asset substitution, dividend policies, claim dilution, and under investment (Wamer and Smith 1997) . In addition, project-bond indentures contain clauses that serve as commitment and incentive devices for host governments and other contracting parties to the project.
In terms of borrowing cost, we find that project bonds are priced at a considerable markup (average 300bps spread) over comparable US Treasury securities, but with a high degree of variation across bonds that depends on project-specific characteristics, bond features, and the quality of host-countries' legal institutions in determining investor rights and the degree of their protection.
However, the preceding graph also shows that project bonds, despite wide variations in number of 3 issues and their size, have consistently carried issue yields below comparable emerging-market sovereign yields (JP Morgan's EMBI Global Index). Two factors are at work. First and foremost, only the most creditworthy projects can tap the markets and, therefore, often carry a comparatively higher credit rating. Second, issuers take particular care in designing their projects' organizational, legal, and financial structure when they wish to fund them in public debt markets. Taken together, both forces suggest that the at-issue spread evolution depicted above is largely due to selfselection by borrowers: only high-quality and well-designed projects and their bonds come to market which then carry credit ratings and issue-yields below a much larger and diverse group of sovereign borrowers.
This note is organized as follows. We next discuss the key economic and financial issues in the international project-bond market before turning to the legal design of typical project bonds in Section Im. Section IV summarizes our analysis of credit-spread determinants that highlight the importance of the ambient institutional development, and Section V concludes.
II. Key Characteristics of the Project-Bond Market
Access to the international bond markets by infrastructure projects in emerging economies is a relatively new phenomenon, borne of the economic reforms, market liberalization, and financial innovations in the early 1990s. The world-wide move towards private participation in infrastructure (PPI) schemes that gained momentum in the early 1 990s brought about fundamental changes in the traditional fiscal financing of infrastructure facilities. 3 It also ushered in structural changes in the way in which infrastructure was operated and managed as a pre-requisite for successful private funding or projects. For instance, the development of structured credit techniques, most prominently limited recourse project financing methods, along with various risk sharing and hedge devices (multilateral and export credit agencies (ECA) guarantees, private political risk insurance), were instrumental in containing projects' credit risk sufficiently to make them of interest to bond investors. At the same time, privatization, market liberalization, and regulatory reforms created an economic environment that could provide private investors with return potentials that could justify the considerable risks associated with debt investments in emerging market infrastructure.
3 Brealey, Cooper and Habib (1996) contains an excellent survey of the economic issues involved in project finance.
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An important factor contributing to investor interest has been the creative design of the debt securities' legal structures such as indenture, trust structure, selective guarantees, and covenant provisions to mitigate risks and provide contractual protection to bond holders. Financial economists have long recognized the adverse incentives that debt finance'provides to shareholders and managers and the agency costs that those entail. Smith and Warner (1979) discuss how bond covenants typically attempt to address various conflicts of interest between different classes of claim holders while Green (1984) and John (1987) forrnally analyze the incentives that leverage creates for shareholders (project sponsors) to enhance their own returns by shifting risk to debtholders through project attribute selection.
While most project bonds are corporate bonds, the reverse is not true. There are subtle financial, economic, and analytical differences between the two segments that merit further attention in the context of an institutional analysis of the market. The dissimilarities primarily stem from the underlying economics of the borrower. In the case of a project, the issuer raises funds to finance a single indivisible large-scale capital investment project whose cash flows are the sole source to meet financial obligations and to provide returns to investors. 4 In the case of a typical corporate borrower, the security is typically issued against the firm's general credit and the underlying assets consist of multiple sources of cash flows. Hence, typical corporate bonds are secured by all the firm's various assets and cash flows that offer in themselves risk diversification and an important cross-insurance mechanism. If a certain set of cash flows becomes unavailable for debt service, firms typically have other sources of cash that might tide the issuer over the liquidity crisis.
No such cross-insurance exists in the case of project bonds: the moment the single source of cash flows ceases to exist, the issuer experiences a liquidity crisis that might force it to default on its bonds. In addition, projects suffer from asset-specificity (location and/or use of the assets), often ill-defined or ill-enforced property rights, and bilateral monopoly settings (dominant output buyer) that render them vulnerable to opportunistic behavior and unilateral contract renegotiation.
Indeed, such opportunistic behavior coupled with shortcomings in the ambient legal institutions is often at the root of project's economic distress and, ultimately, financial distress.
These often overlooked, but crucial differences between project and general corporate bonds subtly affect investors' risk perceptions, the pricing of the bonds, and their legal structure.
In particular, investors do not tend to view the underlying assets as "true security" even if they are pledged as such, but take into account and price factors, such as the creditworthiness of off-takers, third-party guarantees, the legal and institutional environment, and, ultimately, the quality of the cash flows. Put differently, investors in project bonds are much more cash-flow quality oriented than buyers of typical corporate bonds and tend to price factors that determine the underlying economics of the project. However, since projects and their securities demand much more careful analysis of the issuer's economic and legal structures, buyers of project bonds are mostly sophisticated institutional investors that have the requisite analytical expertise, rather than retail investors.
In order to document current trends and best practices in the international project-bond market, we collected a representative sample of 105 emerging market project bonds issued be- Based on a sample of 105 infrastructure-related, US dollar-denominated international bonds issued by projects in 20 emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Rep., Dominican Rep., Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Venezuela) .
On average, emerging-economy project bonds are issued at approximately 300 basis points above US Treasury securities of comparable maturities, have a surprisingly high issue size of US$278 million, a maturity of just under 12 years and are rated slightly below investment grade (exactly between BBB-and BBB). Most project bonds are senior debt or issued against a collection of project receivables as asset-backed securities (ABS). The latter type of debt, while not explicitly senior obligations of the project, are issued as pari passu instruments that will become de facto senior once other unsubordinated debt comes into existence.
Unsecured debt tends to be rated higher than secured debt, possibly reflecting the fact that higher rated projects can afford to provide less security to their investors. In terms of geographic origin, intemational project bonds from Latin America and Asia are more numerous than from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. All major project types are represented albeit with a particular concentration of issues in the energy, power, telecom, and transport sectors.
III. Covenant Provisions
A fruitful conceptual framework for analyzing projects and, in particular, their organizational, contractual, and financial design relies on the view of the firm as a nexus of contracts. First formulated in the seminal papers by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) , it underlies much of modem corporate finance. The allocation of control rights and interaction of all constituent contracts of a firm (infrastructure project) motivate financing choices (Fama, 1990), determine corporate governance arrangements (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , and even provide a framework for project valuation (see Kaplan and Ruback, 1995 for an application in terms of discounted cash flows). Hence, we would expect bond covenants of projects that, by their very nature, most closely correspond to the stylized view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, to reflect and 7 address conflicts of interests not only between different claimholders but also other stakeholders, such as host governments and customers, in the project.
Projects suffer from typical contracting problems arising from relationship specificity, sunk costs, and the associated "hold-up" problem that were first described in other areas of economics by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , and Williamson (1979 Williamson ( , 1983 . Three types of solutions have been proposed in the literature that balance incentives for ex-ante efficient investments and ex-post trade efficient: (i) writing contracts with proper legal remedies in case of breach of contract (Shavell, 1980 and 1984; Rogerson, 1984) , (ii) agreeing on a rule for the re-negotiation of contracts (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994), and (iii) writing option contracts (Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995) . In addition, the parties can always attempt to write a self-enforcing contract so that, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) have argued, conflicts of interest between bondholder and stockholder are resolved through the contractual and financial design of firms. This insight underlies much of our analysis of project bond covenants that we can take to be the contractual responses to the afore-mentioned contracting problems.
Since the presence of risky debt in a firm's capital structure can lead to expost conflicts of interests between the firn's equity holders and bondholders, contractual devices such as debt covenants have evolved to mitigate their adverse consequences. For instance, companies that issue bonds either on a project (non-recourse) or corporate (on-balance sheet) basis, be it in domestic or in international markets, generally agree to a set of contractual covenants requiring them to take or to refrain from taking certain specified actions. Such actions are designed fundamentally to protect the interest of bondholders-safety and seniority of their claims, repayment, and legal remedies in the event of default-after the bonds have been issued. Covenant provisions contained in bond indentures typically take the form of restrictions on dividend, M&A transactions, and asset disposals, limitations on indebtedness, requirements of third party guarantees, maintenance of good regulatory standing and, in certain circumstances, the establishment of offshore and debt service reserve accounts. Violations of such provisions usually trigger contractual penalties or renegotiation and might ultimately lead to default and court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings.
The ability to design and enforce solid bond covenants to protect the interest of bondholders is a critical factor for infrastructure projects located in developing countries in tapping offshore markets for financing. The complexity of infrastructure project finance transactions-8 involving multi-source financing structures, numerous public and private contracting parties, and intricate contractual arrangements and legal documentations, compounded by the weakness in the legal and institutional framework to protect investors interests-makes this task a challenging one.
The specific covenants included in a particular debt agreement and the extent to which such covenants effectively serve to protect the interests of creditors depend inter alia on the nature of the debt instruments, governing law, and the .underpinning legal and institutional frameworks governing contract formation and enforcement. Given that the writing, negotiating, and monitoring of specific provisions are costly, two sets of considerations become relevant: the ease with which the stipulated covenants can be monitored, and the scope for potential opportunistic behavior that could lead to transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
More generally, investors are concerned about the availability of legal recourse that de- In addition, they contain two further categories of clauses that arise from the very specific nature of project finance. Project debt covenants include incentive provisions for the contractors, operators, and sponsors such as performance targets, mandatory penalties, and minimal equity participation in the project. They also contain institutional environment provisions that, in case of changes in the ambient regulatory, legal, or tax environment, trigger change of control and/or mandatory redemption of the debt that would assure bankruptcy and operating disruptions of the project. Akin to poison pills, such provisions strengthen the position of (foreign) creditors vis-avis the host country and its policies.
From our 105 project bonds, we extract a subsample of 27 bonds for which we have detailed covenant information from offering circulars, regulatory filings, and rating analyses. As the following 33.33% Based on information extracted from the offering documents (registration filings, offering circulars, rating studies) availablefor a subsample of 27 infrastructure-related, USD-denominated international bonds. The Frequency column records thefrequency of occurrence of the respective provision types in the bond covenants. In particular, we classified projectbond covenant provisions into 45 broad categories and seven instrument-specific classes and attributed for each bond indenture containing a particular clause orfeature a 1, and 0 otherwise.
While all indentures contain sensibly the same standard provisions aimed at preventing asset substitution, claim dilution, cash payments, and underinvestment, two thirds of the bonds also include project-specific stipulations. Most telling are minimal ownership requirements (19 percent of covenants) for sponsors, operators, contractors, and off-takers. Clearly, such provisions are meant to align the interests of certain stakeholders crucial to the project's commercial success with debtholders. Equity stakes act as commitment and incentive devices for key players. Provisions specifying remedies in case of cost overruns (24 percent of indentures), performance targets (5 percent), capitalization requirements (19 percent), and restrictions on counter-parties (10 percent) further protect the interests of debtholders.
A second set of covenant provisions address the institutional environment and possible opportunistic behavior by regulators and host governments. Roughly one quarter of indentures (24 percent) provide for mandatory debt redemption in case of concession cancellations (a further 17 percent offer optional redemption at the discretion of the bondholders in case of completion, financing, or operating problems). Conversely, 22 percent of covenants stipulate that the projects are to maintain government approval and comply with all laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the project. The objective is clear: on the one hand, the project is not to give the host country any reason to intervene. On the other, mandatory redemption in case of concession cancellations forces the project into bankruptcy so that the ensuing disruption of service is meant to dissuade the host country from unilateral regulatory actions. In the same vein, 77 percent of all indentures require mandatory or optional early redemption in case of changes in tax regulation.
IV. Determinants of Credit Spreads
The cost of international bond financing for infrastructure projects in emerging economies is a key determinant of their tariff structure and, hence, economic viability. Our analysis of at-issue credit spreads of emerging market project bonds over US Treasuries reveals how legal, regulatory, economic, and financial institutions in host countries influence risk perceptions and, hence, the cost of debt for infrastructure development. We find that market risk perception in terms of at-issue spreads over US Treasury bonds are a function of a project's contractual structure and its ambient institutions. Since it is nearly impossible to anticipate on all contingencies in writing the contract, and since parties might have an incentive for opportunistic behavior, contracts are always incomplete by their very nature and need to rely on other institutions for their execution. 6 It emerges that the quality of the ambient institutional environment is an important factor for market risk perceptions and the initial pricing of project bonds.
In theory, the (second-best) optimal choice of debt contracts can mitigate some of these risks as long as investors can threaten the firm with a future cost that one could interpret as collateral realization (Diamond, 1984; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; or Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990) , withholding of new financing (Gromb, 1999 ), or liquidation (Hart and Moore, 1994 and 1998 . In practice, the effectiveness of such covenant provisions critically hinges on the quality of the ambient legal institutions required to make the investors' threat credible and, thus, the contract selfenforcing. Hence, we would expect pricing to be a function of the institutional environment and project attributes bonds in addition to the nature of their covenants.
The institutional, political, and economic environment feeds through to project-bond pricing through the market's collective assessment of the issue's systematic and idiosyncratic risks and, hence, the premium that bondholders demand over comparable default-free sovereign bonds.
First and foremost, investors take into account the likelihood of debtor default and recovery in bankruptcy. In the context of project bonds, counter-party (off-take), price, and demand risk drive idiosyncratic risk perceptions, while political, macroeconomic, and institutional factors such as definition and enforcement of property rights determine the systematic ones. The institutional environment, often overlooked or taken for granted by researchers and practitioners alike, is of particular importance as it can mitigate or amplify the degree to which counter-party and political risks feed through to creditors. Put differently, deficiencies in the institutional development of a host country might exacerbate the market's perception of counter-party and other risk factors in pricing bonds. It also explains why project-rating analyses pay particular attention not only to the project's contractual structure but also to its ambient legal, regulatory, and political environment.
Traditionally, empirical studies of credit spreads have analyzed the dynamic aspects rather than cross-sectional ones such as the legal and institutional factors affecting corporate bonds (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995 or Duffee, 1998) , reflecting the focus of much of the theoretical work in this area. However, recent work by Madan and Unal (2000) Among the institutional variables, legal and regulatory obstacles have the largest and statistically most significant effect: an increase of 1 in the obstacle score for the judiciary increases at-issue spreads by 144 basis points (bpts), for the regulatory and tax variable by 159 bpts (see specification 1 in table 4). Similarly, a 10 point increase in the ICRG composite risk index (e.g., from low to moderate country risk) increases project bond credit spreads by 150 bpts. Insufficient financial development also widens at-issue spreads but the effect is not statistically significant: the recourse to global debt market helps to overcome financing constraints that local firms typically face as an institutional impediment. These findings underline the importance of the ambient legal framework and institutional development for access to external financing, first pointed out by La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) . Similarly, Modigliani and Perrotti (1998) argue that quality of legal enforcement is a determinant of the form of debt borrowers choose.
Regarding bond and project characteristics (specification 2 in table 4) it emerges that maturity and credit ratings are two very significant determinants of at-issue spreads: one additional
year of maturity increases spreads by 2 bpts. A decrease in project rating by one notch (e.g., from BBB+ to BBB) increases spreads by 31 bpts, a similar decrease in the host country's rating by 15 24 bpts. Since project and host country ratings often go hand in hand, the combined effect is a substantial 54 basis points. These findings mirror the results of King and Khang (2002) -80
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In terms of project type, water and transportation projects come to the market at, respectively, 135 and 233 bpts higher than other projects. A possible explanation might lie in the fact that these two types of projects are particularly vulnerable in terms of asset-specificity, unilateral redefinition of property rights, and demand risk. The analysis suggests that covenant protection and, more generally, contractual devices alone are insufficient to overcome shortcomings in the host country's legal, financial, and political institutions. Investors, through their pricing behavior, take into account the quality of the ambient institutional environment. Given the very specific nature of the assets, the scope for opportunistic behavior and the concentrated nature of economic and financial risk inherent in project finance, well-functioning legal, economic, and political institutions provide better investor protection than bond covenants. Bondholders, in turn, reward projects located in host countries that adhere to the rule of law with tighter credit spreads and, hence, lower funding costs. Instead, covenants can serve as incentive devices to all stakeholders in a project including host governments and regulators. Built around easily understood and enforced standard provisions, they include provisions that make it very costly for local parties-government and direct stakeholders-to enhance their own stakes in the project to the detriment of bondholders.
Our findings mirror the results of Elton et al. (2001) who show for a sample of US corporate bonds that expected default accounts for a surprisingly small fraction of the credit spread.
While tax effects explain a substantial portion of the spread, the authors find that factors explaining risk premia for common stock also drive credit spreads.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
This note highlights several important characteristics of international project bond markets. It provides an empirical perspective on typical project-bond covenant provisions on the basis of a sam-ple of project-related fixed income securities issued in international capital markets from January 1993 to March 2002. Furthermore, we complement the discussion of covenant provisions with an analysis of the degree to which the level of institutional development of the projects' host countries matters for the pricing of the bonds.
We find that fixed income investors price both the contractual design of the actual debt security and its ambient institutional environment. As a more detailed analysis of typical projectbond covenants reveals, issuers anticipate concerns by lenders that arise from the particular nature of infrastructure projects, i.e., the assets' location specificity, threat of renegotiation, unilateral regulatory changes, and unilateral redefinition of property rights. At the same time, covenants also strive to implement managerial incentives for owners and operators of project that, hitherto, was thought of as falling into the domain of shareholders. Hence, we conclude that bondholders play a much more active role in the design and governance of project bonds than is the case for traditional corporate bonds.
Our analysis also shows that one cannot view the contractual arrangements of project in isolation from the ambient legal and regulatory environment. Controlling for economic and financial development of the host country, we find that the level of institutional development and, especially, proxies for the rule of law significantly affect market risk perceptions and project-bond pricing. This find is hardly surprising in light of our covenant analysis. In the last consequence, private contracting-rarely able to specify a complete contract-needs to rely on host-country legal institutions to enforce local provisions, contracts and property rights. Hence, two conclusions emerge. First, private contractual arrangements and ambient legal institutions are complements rather than substitutes. Second, investing in building appropriate institutions can decrease the cost of infrastructure development beyond their immediate benefits for society at large. 
APPENDIX

Major Environment Categories
Each fu-m was asked to select three major business impediments out of 12 broad categories to which the following variables belong.
Financing Obstacle FIN
How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your WBES business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Legal Obstacle LEGAL How problematic is functioning of the judiciary for the operation WBES and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Change in Legal Confi-DLEG
Difference in reply over three years to: I am confident that the legal WBES dence system will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes: (1) fully agree, (2) agree in most cases, (3) tend to agree, (4) tend to disagree, (5) disagree in most cases, (6) (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)?
Exchange Rate Obsta-FXRATE How problemnatic are exchange rates for the operation and growth of WBES cle your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a major obstacle (4)? Table 6 Project Bonds
The following table provides a detailed overview of our sample by reporting each bond's issue terns and legal structure. The infornation comes from the issue documentation and third sources such as Bloomberg, IDC, and Thomson Financial Securities Data. Country refers to the host-country, the Maturity is the project bond's time to redemption in years, the At-issue Spread the bond's yield spread over maturity-matched US Treasury securities, the Host-Country Spread the sovereign spread of the country's EMBI Global (JP Morgan) country index over US Treasuries, and all the other variables are selfexplanatory.
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